In the field of mechanism design, the revelation principle has been known for decades. Myerson, Mas-Colell, Whinston and Green gave formal proofs of the revelation principle respectively. However, in this paper, I argue that there are bugs hidden in their proofs.
by "s * i (θ i )" (∀θ i ∈ Θ i , i = 1, · · · , I). Since formula (23.D.2) holds for all s i ∈ S i , it looks reasonable to do so at first sight.
However, as formula (23.D.2) specifies, the expectation is taken over realizations of the other players' random types conditional on player i's realized type θ i (also see Proposition 8.E.1). Note that the input of the function s * i (·) should be a realized type of player i (see Remark 1) , but none ofθ i (∀θ i ∈ Θ i ,θ i = θ i ) can be such realized type since agent i's type has been realized as θ i . Therefore, in formula (23.D.3), the term "s * i (θ i )" (∀θ i ∈ Θ i ,θ i = θ i ) is actually illegal. Put differently, formula (23.D.3) is illegal. That is the bug.
The bug in the proof by Myerson
Here, the notation is referred to Ref. [2] . See the proof of Theorem 2: "... Furthermore, the equilibrium inequalities (14) for π imply the incentive compatible inequalities (6) for π ′ ...". Let us consider the right part of the incentive compatible inequalities (6) for π ′ . For all i,
As specified in the left term "Z i (π ′ , b i |a i )", agent i's type is realized as a i . Therefore, according to Remark 2, the term "σ i (s i |b i )" (for all b i ∈ A i , b i = a i ) is actually illegal. Put differently, the incentive compatible inequalities (6) for π ′ is illegal. That is the bug.
Appendix 1: Definitions and proof in Section 8.E [1]
According to page 255 [1] , formally, in a Bayesian game, each player i has a payoff function u i (s i , s −i , θ i ), where θ i ∈ Θ i is a random variable chosen by nature that is observed only by player i. The joint probability distribution of the θ i 's is given by F (θ 1 , · · · , θ I ), which is assumed to be common knowledge among the players. Letting Θ = Θ 1 ×· · · ×Θ I , a Bayesian game is summarized by [ 
A pure strategy for player i in a Bayesian game is a function s i (θ i ), or decision rule, that gives the player's strategy choice for each realization of his type θ i . Player i's pure strategy set S i is therefore the set of all such functions. Player i's expected payoff given a profile of pure strategies for the I players (s 1 (·), · · · , s I (·)) is then given by:
(8.E.1) ******************************************************************** Remark 1: Following page 148 [3] , the timing of a static Bayesian game is as follows:
Step 1: Nature chooses a type vector θ = (θ 1 , · · · ,θ I ), whereθ i is the realized type of agent i;
Step 2: Nature revealsθ i to player i but not to any other player;
Step 3: The players simultaneously output (s 1 (θ 1 ), · · · , s I (θ I ));
Step 4: Each player i receives the payoff u i (s 1 (θ 1 ), · · · , s I (θ I ),θ i ).
For each player i = 1, · · · , I, consider his strategy function s i (·), then: 1) s i (·) is chosen (or controlled) by player i, and is his private information; 2) In a static Bayesian game, player i's type can be realized as any element of Θ i . The realized type of player i is his private information;
3) The input of s i (·) must be a realized typeθ i in Θ i , and the output of s i (·) is s i (θ i ) which is observable to the outside agent (either principal or mediator). 
) is defined as in Eq(8.E.1).
A very useful point to note is that in a (pure strategy) Bayesian Nash equilibrium each player must be playing a best response to the conditional distribution of his opponents' strategies for each type that he might end up having. Proposition 8.E.1 provides a more formal statement of this point.
if and only if, for all i and allθ i ∈ Θ i occurring with positive probability,
for all s ′ i ∈ S i , where the expectation is taken over realizations of the other players' random variables conditional on player i's realization of his signalθ i .
Proof : For necessity, note that if Eq(8.E.2) did not hold for some player i for someθ i ∈ Θ i that occurs with positive probability, then player i could do better by changing his strategy choice in the event he gets realizationθ i , contradicting (s 1 (·), · · · , s I (·)) being a Bayesian Nash equilibrium. In the other direction, if condition Eq(8.E.2) holds for allθ i ∈ Θ i occurring with positive probability, then player i cannot improve on the payoff he receives by playing strategy s i (·).
Appendix 2: Definitions and proof in Section 23.B and 23.D [1] (P858) Consider a setting with I agents, indexed by i = 1, · · · , I. These agents make a collective choice from some set X of possible alternatives. Prior to the choice, each agent i privately observes his type θ i that determines his preferences. The set of possible types for agent i is denoted as Θ i . The vector of agents' types θ = (θ 1 , · · · , θ I ) is drawn from set Θ = Θ 1 ×· · ·×Θ I according to probability density φ(·). Each agent i's Bernoulli utility function when he
Definition 23.B.1: A social choice function is a function f : Θ 1 × · · · × Θ I → X that, for each possible profile of the agents' types (θ 1 , · · · , θ I ), assigns a collective choice f (θ 1 , · · · , θ I ) ∈ X.
Definition 23.B.3: A mechanism Γ = (S 1 , · · · , S I , g(·)) is a collection of I strategy sets S 1 , · · · , S I and an outcome function g : S 1 × · · · × S I → X.
Definition 23.B.4: The mechanism Γ = (S 1 , · · · , S I , g(·)) implements social choice function f (·) if there is an equilibrium strategy profile (s * 1 (·), · · · , s * I (·)) of the game induced by Γ such that g(s * 1 (θ 1 ), · · · , s * I (θ I )) = f (θ 1 , · · · , θ I ) for all (θ 1 , · · · , θ I ) ∈ Θ 1 , · · · , Θ I .
Definition 23.B.5: A direct revelation mechanism is a mechanism in which S i = Θ i for all i and g(θ) = f (θ) for all θ ∈ Θ 1 × · · · × Θ I .
Definition 23.B.6: The social choice function f (·) is truthfully implementable (or incentive compatible) if the direct revelation mechanism Γ = (S 1 , · · · , S I , f (·)) has an equilibrium (s * 1 (·), · · · , s * I (·)) in which s * i (θ i ) = θ i for all θ i ∈ Θ i and all i = 1, · · · , I; that is, if truth telling by each agent i constitutes an equilibrium of Γ = (S 1 , · · · , S I , f (·)).
Definition 23.D.1: The strategy profile s * (·) = (s * 1 (·), · · · , s * I (·)) is a Bayesian Nash equilibrium of mechanism Γ = (S 1 , · · · , S I , g(·)) if, for all i and all
Definition 23.D.2: The mechanism Γ = (S 1 , · · · , S I , g(·)) implements the social choice function f (·) in Bayesian Nash equilibrium if there is a Bayesian Nash equilibrium of Γ, s * (·) = (s * 1 (·), · · · , s * I (·)), such that g(s * (θ)) = f (θ) for all θ ∈ Θ.
Definition 23.D.3: The social choice function f (·) is truthfully implementable in Bayesian Nash equilibrium if s * i (θ i ) = θ i (for all θ i ∈ Θ i and i = 1, · · · , I) is a Bayesian Nash equilibrium of the direct revelation mechanism Γ = (Θ 1 , · · · , Θ I , f (·)). That is, if for all i = 1, · · · , I and all θ i ∈ Θ i ,
Proposition 23.D.1 (The Revelation Principle for Bayesian Nash Equilibrium) Suppose that there exists a mechanism Γ = (S 1 , · · · , S I , g(·)) that implements the social choice function f (·) in Bayesian Nash equilibrium. Then f (·) is truthfully implementable in Bayesian Nash equilibrium.
Proof : Since Γ = (S 1 , · · · , S I , g(·)) implements f (·) in Bayesian Nash equilibrium, then there exists a profile of strategies s * (·) = (s * 1 (·), · · · , s * I (·)) such that g(s * (θ)) = f (θ) for all θ, and for all i and all θ i ∈ Θ i ,
for allŝ i ∈ S i . Condition (23.D.2) implies that for all i and all θ i ∈ Θ i ,
for allθ i ∈ Θ i . Since g(s * (θ)) = f (θ) for all θ, (23.D.3) means that, for all i and all θ i ∈ Θ i ,
for allθ i ∈ Θ i . But, this is precisely condition (23.D.1), the condition for f (·) to be truthfully implementable in Bayesian Nash equilibrium. Q.E.D.
Appendix 3: Definitions and proof in Ref. [2]
The arbitrator's problem is described by a Bayesian collective choice problem, an object of the form:
The individual members of the group, or players, are numbered 1, 2, · · · , n. C is the set of choices available to the group. For each player i, A i is the set of possible types for player i. Each U i : C × A 1 × · · · × A n → R is a utility function such that each U i (c, a 1 , · · · , a n ) is the payoff which player i would get if c ∈ C were chosen and if (a 1 , · · · , a n ) were the true vector of player types. P is a probability distribution on A 1 × · · · × A n such that P (a 1 , · · · , a n ) is the probability, as judged by the arbitrator, that (a 1 , · · · , a n ) is the true vector of types for the n players.
For some collection of response sets S 1 , · · · , S n , a choice mechanism is defined as a real-valued function π with a domain of the form C × (S 1 × · · · × S n ) such that:
c ′ ∈C π(c ′ |s 1 , · · · , s n ) = 1, and π(c|s 1 , · · · , s n ) ≥ 0 for all c,
for every (s 1 , · · · , s n ) ∈ S 1 × · · · × S n .
Given a choice mechanism π, for any player i and for any a i ∈ A i and b i ∈ A i , let:
where (α −i , b i ) = (α 1 , · · · , α i−1 , b i , α i+1 , · · · , α n ), P i (α|a i ) = 0 if α i = a i . Z i (π, b i |a i ) is the conditionally-expected utility payoff for player i, given that his type is a i , if he says that his type is b i when π is the choice mechanism and when all other players are expected to tell the truth.
A choice mechanism π using the standard response sets is said to be Bayesian incentive compatible if
If choice mechanism π is used and if everyone is honest, then player i's conditionally-expected payoff when he knows a i is:
The allocation of conditionally-expected payoffs associated with mechanism π is the vector:
This is a vector of n i=1 |A i | real numbers, indexed on the disjoint union of the A i sets. If the arbitrator could use any choice mechanism and expect honest responses, then we would define the feasible set of expected allocation vectors to be:
The set of incentive-feasible expected allocation vectors is defined to be:
A response plan for player i is a function σ i mapping each type a i ∈ A i onto a probability distribution over his response set S i . That is, if σ i is player i's response plan, then σ i (s i |a i ) is the probability that player i will tell the arbitrator s i if his true type is a i . ******************************************************************** Remark 2: Like Remark 1, I list the timing of a static Bayesian game as follows:
Step 1: Nature chooses a type vector (ā 1 , · · · ,ā n ), whereā i is the realized type of agent i;
Step 2: Nature revealsā i to player i but not to any other player;
Step 3: Player i tells his response s i to the arbitrator according to the probability σ i (s i |ā i ). All players tell the arbitrator simultaneously.
Step 4: The arbitrator assigns choice c to all players according to the probability π(c|s 1 , · · · , s n ).
Step 5: Each player i receives the payoff U i (c,ā 1 , · · · ,ā n ).
For each player i = 1, · · · , n, consider his response plan σ i (s i |·), then: 1) σ i (s i |·) is chosen (or controlled) by player i, and is his private information; 2) In a static Bayesian game, player i's type can be realized as any element of A i . The realized type of player i is his private information;
3) The input of σ i (s i |·) must be a realized typeā i in A i , and the output of σ i (s i |·) is the probability that player i will tell the arbitrator s i if his true type isā i . 4) Suppose player i's type has been realized asā i in Step 1, then in Step 3, it is illegal to let player i act using another response plan σ i (s i |b i ) for any b i ∈ A i , b i =ā i . ******************************************************************** If (σ 1 , · · · , σ n ) lists the players' response plans for the choice mechanism π, and if player i knows that a i is his true type, then player i's expected utility payoff is:
The vector of conditionally-expected payoffs generated by (σ 1 , · · · , σ n ) is:
This is a vector with n i=1 |A i | components, indexed on the disjoint union of the A i sets, like the V(π). We say that (σ 1 , · · · , σ n ) is a response-plan equilibrium for the choice mechanism π if, for any player i and type a i ∈ A i , for every possible alternative response plan σ ′ i for player i: W i (π, σ 1 , · · · , σ n |a i ) ≥ W i (π, σ 1 , · · · , σ i−1 , σ ′ i , σ i+1 , · · · , σ n |a i ).
The set of equilibrium-feasible expected allocation vectors is defined to be:
F * * = {W(π, σ 1 , · · · , σ n ) : π is a choice mechanism, and (σ 1 , · · · , σ n ) is a response-plan equilibrium for π}.
Theorem 2: F * * = F * . Proof : If (σ 1 , · · · , σ n ) is a response-plan equilibrium for a mechanism π on S 1 , · · · , S n , then we can define an equivalent choice mechanism π ′ on A 1 , · · · , A n by:
π ′ (c|α) = s∈S 1 ×···×Sn π(c|s) · ( n i=1 σ i (s i |α i )).
It is easy to check that V(π ′ ) = W(π, σ 1 , · · · , σ n ), so that the allocations generated are the same. Furthermore, the equilibrium inequalities (14) for π imply the incentive compatible inequalities (6) for π ′ . Thus x = W(π, σ 1 , · · · , σ n ) ∈ F * * implies x = V(π ′ ) ∈ F * . So F * * ⊆ F * . I omit the rest of proof. Q.E.D.
